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A MONTHLY
OR INDEPENDENT AND
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ONE KOREA



☆☆☆ Full Story of the Coup

☆☆☆ Dawn of Anti-military Struggle

☆☆☆ Weak Economic Policies

☆☆☆ U.N. Must Take Responsibility

☆☆☆ Chang and Pak

NO. 2

JULY 1961

Special Edition
on the
S. Korean Coup d'etat

Our Aims and Demands

Liberation from Japanese Imperialism did not bring complete freedom and independence to Korea. Instead, the Big Powers of the world split the Korean territory and nation into two countries. And to this day, the Korean people have been suffering for sixteen long years under the most piteous and distressing conditions. Not only have we constantly wandered on the brinks of death, pressed by poverty and oppression, but we at last had to commit the most shameful mistake in our history: Incited by foreign powers, we Koreans engaged ourselves in the horrible task of killing our own brothers during that tragical Korean War. Yet, in spite of all these sufferings and injustices, the Korean people obediently held trust in the good faiths of the Big Powers, and solely believed that they would carve out the future of Korea for us.

But today we have finally realized our stupidity. We know well now that we must carve out our own destiny with our own hands, that is, the Korean nation must realize unification of Korea by the nation's own powers if it is willing to live. And the people's uprising in April last year which overthrew that most atrocious government of all times, the Syngman Rhee regime, without borrowing any aid from others, has given us the confidence that we can accomplish this aspiration.

We, as members of the Korean nation and campaigners for the unification movement, urged by such consciousness and confidence, propose here that our Independent and Peaceful Unification shall commence by conducting mutual contact and exchange between the North and South Korean people. Whereby, we are sure, brotherly love will be renewed and North and South negotiations invited; thus enabling concrete plans for unification to be worked out. We also believe that the unification must be not only the unification of the Korean territories but also of the divided nation. And in order to reflect the true will of the entire nation on the unification, we call for a Free General Elections to be held throughout North and South Korea; and through these elections, a Unified Central Government shall be established. From these standpoints, we demand:

1) *To immediately open up exchanges of letters, civilian travel, culture and trade between North and South Korea.*
2) *To convene at once an All-Korea Conference represented by delegates from the Governments, political parties and civil organizations of both Koreas, to study and work out the measures for preparing the All-Korea General Elections and establishing the Unified Central Government.*

We are convinced that these demands are fully legitimate, equitable and just since they are based on the standpoints of humanity, fundamental rights and the principle of self-determination. Still we cannot ignore the bearings which the Korean Unification problem has on the international relations. Thus emphasizing the original mission of the United Nations; respecting the authority of the 1954 Geneva Conference in which both the North and South Korean Delegations had participated, and acknowledging adoption of the Agreements reached at the said Conference, we request the nations concerned:

1) *To call as soon as possible an International Conference that shall further the accomplishments of the Political Conference on the Korean Question held at Geneva in 1954, and accelerate the Korean unification by assisting the independent unification movements of the Korean people.*
   Besides those nations which participated in the 1954 Conference, delegations from the four nations constituting the Korean Armistice Observation Commission (Switzerland, Sweden, Poland and Czechoslavakia) and India shall participate in the proposed Conference.
2) *All nations participating in this International Conference shall assume the responsibility to secure the peace in the Korean Peninsula and to guarantee the peaceful development of Unified Korea.*
   In order to secure these guarantees, the United States, the Soviet Union and all other countries shall immediately stop supplying weapons and all other military aids to the present Governments of North and South Korea; shall pledge to assist in the reconstruction of Korea on conditions of non-intervention in her internal affairs and also not to utilize Unified Korea as military bases; and shall recommend immediate membership of Unified Korea to the United Nations.
3) *The same nations shall also support, when requested, the projects of the Unification Projects Agency which will be established by tne All-Korea Confererecce, and also set up an International Supervision Commission to supervise the All-Korea General Elections which will be administered by the above Agency.*
   The International Supervision Commission shall be formed by nations that did not participate in the Korean War, but elected by the participating nations in the proposed International Conference and confirmed by the United Nations.
4) *The foreign armed forces stationed in Korea shall be replaced by International Police Forces ana evacuate Korea as soon as possible.*
   The International Police Forces shall be organized by troops from nations that did not participate in the Korean War; shall have missions to maintain the peace in Korea and also to secure an atmosphere in which free and fair elections can be enforced; and shall withdraw from Korea when requested by the Unified Korea Government.

Unification of Korea is a matter of life and death to the Korean people. No one, no nation should be allowed to bar our way. Therefore, we here appeal to the world to understand and to extend its support to our aims and demands.

ONE KOREA

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF NEWS AND VIEWS ON KOREAN UNIFICATION MOVEMENTS

July 1, 1961 Vol. 2

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Published Monthly by

TONG-IL CHOSEON SHINMOON INC.

(Newspaper for Korean Unification)

Publisher & Editor:
YEE YOUNG KEUN

1-1 Yotsuya, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, Japan

Tel. Tokyo (341)5849, (351)8213

Printed in Japan

A Word for "One Korea"

DISSOLVE THE MILITARY REGIME AT ONCE

In less than a month and a half time since they took over the ROK Government, the militarists have fully revealed their power-hungry nature.

The militarists emerged on the political scene with cries that the nation's crisis had called them to reconstruct the country by ousting the corrupt and inefficient Chang Government, and they pledged themselves to oppose Communism, root out corruption, solve the miseries of the people and reconstruct the nation's economy and morals as well.

These were all lies. Everybody in Korea knows that the military is the most corrupt quarter of the nation. No one, at heart, expects them to do any house-cleaning. Less, solve the miseries of the people. And since strengthening of anti-Communism would but perpetuate the division of Korea, the militarists would need an Aladdin's lamp to save the crumbling economy of South Korea. All sensible Koreans agree that the only way to salvage South Korean economy is through unification.

The May 16th military coup d'etat must, in no ways, be confused with the people's April Revolution of last year. They differ essentially in every aspect. They are poles apart in their motives, execution and goals. The coup d'etat was but a 19th century-styled government usurpation staged by a handful of ambitious soldiers.

NOTE THE ATROCITIES

The military junta arrested, in the early stage of its rule, the real big shots among the so-called illicit profiteers and advertised in front of the nation that they really meant what they had said. But, in less than two weeks, all these alleged fortune makers were released and the junta has become body guards for these profiteers instead.

While appeasing the moneyed-class in such manner, the military regime cannot as yet work out a single relief plan to counter the serious unemployment problem. Over 5 million people (half of the working population) is out of jobs. "Give us time" the militarists say just like their predecessor Chang Myun.

(cont. from page 1)

DISSOLVE THE MILIT. REGIME

Livelihood is getting really bad. But, the military regime is too busy to think about the hardships of the people. The militarists are all-out to annihilate their rivals and to suppress the masses. Another period of darkness has been ushered into Korea by these new dictators.

All political parties, student, youth and labor organizations were dissolved at once. Tens of thousand citizens have unlawfully been thrown into jails. The militarists don't give a heed to warrants or rights to have counsels, and through cruel tortures, are forcing the suspected to confess to their false accusations. Junior high school students who boycotted their unilicensed teacher, were sentenced to 1 to 2 years' of hard labor. Can such brutality be left at large in this civilized world?

But, there seems to be no end to their atrocities. Every single soul in the nation who advocated unification, regardless of men, women or children, were horded into jails. The militarists who deem these people their biggest threats, are scheming to annihilate them by a special anti-revolutionary law that they've recently written up. Mad as they are, they might really do it in order to show the foreign forces that they are full-fledged anti-communists and thus cling to their ruling power by enlisting foreign aid. And, to crown it all, they might even ignite a powder keg at the Truce Zone and create tensions so that the nation's eyes will be turned away from crucial problems at home.

NO ONE SHALL OBSTRUCT UNIFICATION

Can we let such brutal acts against humanity, democracy, national interests and peace go by? Absolutely not. While the militarists are endulging in their brutal game of terrorization, the international atmosphere surrounding Korea is getting tense.

Military coup was considered an impossibility to occur in Korea, since the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the U.N. Forces are stationed there. Still, the impossible occured, and these U.N. agencies which should have acted so as to set things right, are taking a line to admit everything as a fait accompli.

So freedom and democracy in Korea have been completely destroyed. Suppression, poverty and terror reign now. And the nation's long cherished aspiration for unification is in danger of being strangled too. However, no one is allowed, whether militarists or foreign forces, to obstruct the Korean people's only way to existence, to democracy and to happiness, peace and security—unification.

So we Koreans demand the United Nations and all other nation's concerned to take immediate steps to dissolve this atrocious military regime of South Korea. If this cannot be done, they might as well take their hands off Korea. Then the Korean people can bring down the militarists by their own powers overnight, thus normalize the deplorable situation in Korea and clear the way for unification.

If the United Nations and the nations concerned should refrain from taking measures to dissolve this unlawful military regime and insist on maintaining the status quo, calamity is bound to befall not only on Korea but the world as well.

THE FULL STORY OF THE S. KOREAN MILITARY COUP

THE MILITARY TAKEOVER OF THE S. KOREAN GOVERNMENT IS ABOUT THE MOST SCANDALOUS FOUL PLAY CONCEIVABLE. WE WILL HERE GIVE THE FULL ACCOUNTS OF THE CONSPIRACY, MUTINY, ATROCITY AND TYRANNY COMMITTED BY THE MILITARISTS AGAINST DEMOCRACY.

I. THE EVE OF THE COUP

As generally reported, the setting in South Korea was more than enough to invite a coup d'etat. Unemployment, famine, power and capital shortages, corruption, anti-government demonstrations, unification movements etc. set South Korea in a state of chronic political crisis, business stagnation and social unrest. The background was perfect to stage a coup.

Economic Deterioration. According to a recent research done by the Bank of Korea, total fully unemployed in urban areas reached a critical point of 2,400,000 persons in April, and if partly unemployed were added to this figure, the total amounted to more than 4,200,000 persons half of the labor populace. In rural districts, more than 5 million of the agricultural population were famishing on the brinks of starvation with no food on hand.

Meanwhile, prices have rocketed 30% during a year's period since April last year. (The Korean hwan was devaluated three times during the same period being cut from hwan-dollar rate of 500:1 down to 1300:1) Such price rises naturally shot up production costs and businesses are feeling severe shortage in capital and sales drop. Furthermore, power shortages have forced plants to curtail production as much as 75%. The case is quite serious. Against the minimum power demand of 420,000 KW, power stations in South Korea can only supply 200,000 KW.

As buying power diminishes in ratio to the increase in unemployment and impoverishment of the farmers, plants must cut down on production or close down. Then, more people are turned out from their jobs. So, the vicious cycle goes round and round.

To counter this critical situation, the deposed Chang Government had staked its destiny on the National Development Project which commenced in March. The plan aimed at getting two birds with one stone: by devoloping the country's resources, the Government sought creating relief work for the unemployed and the farmers. But, to Chang's despair, the project hardly got rolling. Funds couldn't be raised and eventually it went up on the rocks.

Political Bankruptcy. The Chang Government failed politically too. Although it got off on a start committed to "accomplish the tasks of the April Revolution," Chang's Democratic Party had received enormous campaign funds for the July Elections of last year from illicit fortune-makers under the Rhee regime and thus had already sown seeds to breed corruption. With its hands stained at the very outset,

it could, in no ways, live up to the expectations of the people.

The prosecutions of anti-democratic elements and illicit fortune-makers during the Rhee era were sabotaged. Political favoritism, unfair elections, bribery among officials, prevailed. Negotiations with Japan took a line contrary to national sentiment, ROK diplomacy at the United Nations blundered and, on top of everything, Chang Government couldn't get a thing done on unification which was the call of the times. So political chaos and social unrest deepened each day. A public poll carried out by the government at the end of last year indicated that only 3% of the populace supported the government.

Rise Of Unification Forces.. Since the situation deteriorated in such manner, voices claiming "unification is the only road to live" arose from the people and, in time, the movements for "Independent Unification" spread like a prairie fire throughout the country. Demands to open up North-South exchange of trade, culture and letters sprung from every quarter of the nation. A "Council for Independent National Unification" was formed in Feb. on a nation-wide scale and students throughout the country organized a united front to spearhead the independent unification movements.

Dreading this ever-mounting aspiration for unification, the government devised enacting such suppressive laws as the "Provisional Special Law for Anti-Communism" and the "Demonstration Disciplining Law" to counter the movements. The attempt, however, boomeranged. In March, a few days before these notorious law bills were to be presented to the National Assembly, large-scaled strikes organized by labor unions, student leagues and progressive politicians broke out in Seoul, Taegu Pusan, Kwangchu and other cities. The government withdrew the bills, but tension mounted.

"April Crisis." As the first anniversary of the April Revolution approached wide speculations circulated that another popular uprising would break out. The "April crisis," however, went by without much trouble. Encouraged by this slight change of wind, Premier Chang bred hopes of long-term rule and got down to the work of strengthening his Cabinet.

But, soon another head-aching situation developed. On May 5, the National Students League for National Independent Unification decided to send delegates to Panmunjom where they would hold North-South Student Conference and exchange with the North Korean students. A national rally was held in Seoul to send off the students. The Conference was looked forward to make a break-through to unification. The Chang Government, at a loss to hold back the students, was again placed in a tight spot.

Military Takeover. It was at this point that the military staged its coup. Though it is quite clear that the setting was sufficient to invite such a coup, that by no means, will justify the cause of the militarists. If a revolution was needed, it should have been a popular revolution that would have brought down the anti-national and undemocratic Chang Government and put up a new government which will work for democratic development and unification of Korea.

The military takeover was a thing totally different in nature. It was a counter revolution, by which the militarists merely usurped the government.

II. PREPARATIONS FOR THE COUP

From top South Korean politicians grounded in Japan due to the coup and reports coming from Korea, we have been able to put together what we can say the inside story of the coup.

Personal Ambitions. The recent coup

d'etat was, in no ways, motivated by such objectives as "strengthening of anti-communism" or "wiping out corruption" as the coup leaders have been publicizing. It was done out of personal interest and impure motives nursed by the two top leaders of the coup, Chang Do Yung and Pak Chung Hi.

Joint Conspiracy by the Two Changs. The most astonishing part of the coup was that it had originally been planned jointly by Premier Chang and Lt. Gen. Chang, and that the U.N. Command is believed to have been given prior knowledge of the scheme. The budding of the coup can be traced up to Feb. Pressed by anti-government feelings within the army, Premier Chang replaced army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong Nok with Chang Do Yung on Feb. 17. Choe is considered one of the ablest military chiefs; while Chang is not with a good reputation. Still, Premier Chang forced the nomination. By promoting Chang Do Yung to this highest army post, the premier sought to oblige this fellow provincial to get the army on the government side and if riots should break out in April, the army would come out to crush them.

From the beginning of March to April 19th, the day of the first anniversary of the Revolution, the army, actually carried out grand maneuvers around Seoul, Taegu and Pusan in obvious demonstration against the anti-government rallies held in those sectors. But, as the demonstrators did not cause much trouble, the army, for the time being, had to sheathe its swords.

Maj. Gen. Pak Picked As Chief Engineer. Returning once more to the details of the conspiracy, it would be interesting to know what exactly went on behind the scenes. On orders from Premier Chang, Gen. Chang began preparations for the coup as soon as he assumed the post of army chief of staff. Among many officers, he picked Maj. Gen. Pak, vice-commander of the 2nd Army, to engineer the coup. Pak had been living in resentment being sacked from the army strategic staff by Gen. Choe when the latter was serving as the army chief of staff.

Although Choe had been transferred to the post of 2nd Army commander, it was still dangerous to have this influencial general around. So the conspirators got him out of the country to study in the U.S. and the way was clear for Pak to draft out the details of the coup.

The Lee Kyu-kwang Incident: Boomerang. On April 25, Chang Do Yung arrested former MP Commander, Brig. Gen. Lee Kyu-Kwang. The charges were that (1) Gen. Lee had written and distributed in the name of "Patriotic Retired Officier's Club" a reprehensible literature slandering Chang Do Yung and two other generals and (2) had given orders during the April Revolution last year, to put fire on the residence of representative Son, then president of the pro-Rhee newspaper, Seoul Shinmun. This action ironically boomeranged on Chang. Since the arrest seemed unlawful, the House Defense Committee immediately probed into the matter.

Although the literature was actually distributed, it was doubtful whether Gen. Lee had written it and there were no evidence that the general had a hand in the arson. From these reasons, the House Defense Committee Investigation Commission issued a statement to the effect that the army was impetuous in arresting Gen. Lee and that the action bore Signs of factionalism. And, moreover, the investigation uncovered shocking facts.

Chang Do Yung: Rotten General. From this investigation, the following misconducts and illicit deals of Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung became clear (all these points were listed in the literature):

1) During the Korean War, Gen. Chang, then chief of the army intelligence bureau, amassed enormous fortunes through illicit trade deals with the North Koreans.

2) In the March 15th Presidential Elections of last year (the rigged-elections which was the direct cause of the April Revolution), utilizing his position as 2nd

Army commander, he served the causes of Syngman Rhee by forcing open votes through bribes to commanders of reserve divisions and also by using the CIC to guard the voting booths.

3) Has two concubines, a son by his legal wife, two children by one of the concubines and is presently living with the other concubine.

4) Had purposely suspended the military tribunal to try Lt. Gen. Wo Yong-Duk, MP commander during Rhee regime, charged with treason against democracy.

5) Had worked on Premier Chang in post-April Revolution days to get his name off the retiring list by making enormous contributions to a certain conservative party (most likely the Democratic Party).

Pushed To The Walls. The Investigation Commission perceiving shady reasons behind the nomination of Chang Do Yung to army chief of staff, moved to make the investigation final and official. Embarrassed by such developments, Premier Chang waited for an opportunity to fire the general. Once the investigations were made public, the incident would develop into a big political scandal. Fortunately for Premier Chang, the "April crisis" had passed and political calm was seen ahead. There was no need for Gen. Chang any more.

Presently, Gen. Choe returned from the U.S. and Gen. Chang was in danger of getting ousted by the army too. Thus forsaken by Premier Chang and hemmed in by his enemies within the army, Chang Do Yung was pushed to the walls.

Pak In Resentment. Pak Chung Hi was another general who wasn't happy about Choe's homecoming. As deputy commander of the 2nd Army, Pak had been exercising his influences, but since 2nd Army commander Choe returned in late April, Pak was put back in his place. So, under the circumstances, the only way out of the crossfire for Chang Do Yung and Pak Chung Hi, was to execute the coup d'etat as they had planned it to crush the prospected riots.

The Count-down. On May 20th, the student delegates to attend the North-South Student Conference were to start on their peace march to Panmunjom where they would meet the North Korean students. The government hadn't the guts now power to halt the students. If the army should arise then in the name of anti-Communism, the causes of the coup would be justified and, therefore, can enlist the support of the U.N. Command. In this line of thought, the date of the execution was fixed. The count-down is said to have been given by the more cool and mature Pak. So the coup was launched on predawn hours of May 16th.

III. THE COURSE OF THE COUP AND ITS REACTIONS

3500 Troops.. The takeover was executed by a force of 3,500 men. Paratroops and marines from the 1st Airborne Brigade and the 3rd Marine Corps belonging to the 2nd Army constituted the main force and was supported by five infantry battalions of the 6th Army.

The ROK armed forces rank 4th in the world having nearly 700,000 men strong divided into 18 divisions of regulars and 10 divisions of reserves. The 1st Field Army guards the front line at the 38th parallel, while the 2nd Army is in charge of supply and command of the reserve corps. The navy has 40,000 men and 75 warships and the air force about 25,000 men and some 300 fighter-planes. Thus the number of troops that participated in the coup amounts to only one two-hundredth or only 0.5% of the entire forces.

Operation Coup. The paratroopers of the 1ts Airborne Brigade who served as

spearheads, launched operations from the Kimpo barracks at 2 A.M. of May 16. They joined with marines at Han River Bridge and with tanks at their front began crossing the bridge. A MP detachment on the bridge outpost opened fire but after a little skirmish leaving seven wounded, the way was cleared. This was the only resistance met and by 4 A.M., the coup forces reached the Seoul Railway Station. From here, paratroopers swept down on Bando Hotel where Premier Chang Myun resided only to find that he had already escaped Other detachments caught President Yun and detained him in his official residence and also arrested ministers: Chung (foreign), Hyon (defense) and Han (communications).

Military Junta Set Up. By 5 A.M., the coup forces had the National Assembly building, Seoul Broadcasting Station, Seoul Police Headquarters, Defense Ministry and Home Affairs Ministry in their hands, whereby they immediately set up a Military Revolutionary Junta in the Army Headquarters. A five men military committee was also formed with Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Hi, Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-Ha, Brig. Gen. Yun Te-il, Brig. Gen. Choe Myung-Shin and Brig. Gen. Son Chang-ho as members. Commander of the coup forces and army chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung became the Chairman of the Junta and through Radio Seoul, announced the following statement:

"Dear fellow countrymen. The ROK armed forces which moved into action at 3 A.M. this morning, have now seized all the administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the state and formed a Military Revolutionary Junta. The military has risen because we thought we could no longer leave the destiny of the nation in the hands of corrupt and incompetent Chang Government and present politicians and surmount the national crisis. The military junta will:

1) assume anti-Communism as its primary object and readjust and strengthen the heretofore formal-like anti-Communism structure.

2) uphold the United Nations Charter, abide by international agreements and further friendly ties with the United States and all other allies.

3) root out corruption and past evils, arouse patriotic spirit and thus reestablish national morality and a fresh social atmosphere.

4) relieve the people's hardships which is nearing despair and famine and put all-out efforts to build a self-sustaining economy.

5) accumulate the nation's powers in building the country's strength to face a showdown with the Communists on unification which is the basic wish of the nation.

6) transfer the government to new and conscientious politicians as soon as the missions of the military revolution are accomplished, then return to our original duties.

Fellow brethrens of Korea! Place full trust in the military junta. There is no need to get excited. We request you to go on as usual with your businesses. We ask for unity, endurance, courage and progress. Hurrah for the Republic of Korea! Hurrah for the ROK armed forces!

Signed: Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung.

Chairman, Military Revolutionary Junta

Sweeping Decrees. The junta then proclaimed martial law throughout the country and issued the following decrees:

Decree No. 1

1) Social gatherings of more than 5 persons shall be prohibited.

2) The presses, publishers and broadcasting stations must enforce voluntary censorship. News, editorials, cartoons and photos dealing with the revolution must not offend security or be unlawfully exaggerated. This applies correspondingly to foreign presses also.

4) Acts of retaliation shall not be permitted.

5) Acts of abandoning jobs without notice and subversions shall be prohibited.

6) Circulation of mal-rumors shall not

be allowed.

7) Curfew shall be set from 7 P.M. till 5 A.M. next morning. All violators of this decree and enemy-aiders shall be arrested and punished at once.

Decree No. 2 put a freeze on all financial organizations and Decree No. 3 closed down all seaports and airports and suspended operations of all intra-country air and sea travel.

Junta Line-up. Following these decrees, the junta announced its line-up of new commanders and leaders as follows: Martial law commanders: Front line area—Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-lim (1st Field Army comdr.), Seoul area—Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Hi and Lt. Gen. Choe Kyung Nok (2nd Army comdr.). Coups leaders: Kim Shin (Air force chief of staff), Kim Song-on (marine corps commandant). Lee Son-on (navy chief of staff). Lee Sang-ok (chief of second bureau army staff), Kim Yung-kon (marine brigade comdr.). Chang Song-Ho. Kim Tom-ka. Choe Nyon. and Yun Be-ok.

The line-up gave the impression that the coup had the support of the entire armed forces but the list was really cooked up by the junta.

ROK Forces Reluctant. The Associated Press reported on the night of May 16: "The U.N. Command has put all the forces on the alert and its spokeman has issued the following statement: "According to reports obtained by the U.N. Command, the present situation is as follows: It appears that only 3,600 troops were moved into Seoul. All these troops belong to reserve forces. The front line ROK army, air and naval forces are guarding their positions and have all pledged to abide by their duties. It is clear that the majority of the nation is not in support of the coup." The AP then reported that the officers and men of the 1st Field Army were assuming a neutral attitude for the time being. The AFP wired that reports of the ROK navy not supporting the coup were circulating.

It is evident from these reports that the coup did not have the support of the entire ROK armed forces. They, in fact were critical towards the takeover, as we can see from the following UPI report: "The coup forces surrounded the Army Command Headquarters on the afternoon of May 16, and threatened to bombard the army staff office unless the staff officers issue a statement in support of the coup. The staff officers had been recoiling from supporting the coup because of Gen. Magruder's statement backing the Chang Government. The threat, however, was enough to change their minds. The forces which encircled the Army Headquarters was said to be led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Hi. According to other informations, Commandant Kim Yung-kon of the marine corps and member of the junta has with drawn his support of the revolution."

U.S. Reaction. The 7 A.M. (May 16th) broadcast of the U.S. Armed Forces Radio in Seul rapped the coup as an act of military violence. United Nations Force Commander, Gen. Magruder alerted the U.S. forces under his command to stand by, and called on the coup forces to return to their original positions. His statement read: "I request all soldiers under my command to support the only lawful government of Korea. I also hope that the ROK forces will return the government to Premier Chang and restore order within the ROK army."

U.S. Embassy Charge d'Affaires Marshall Green agreed with Gen. Magruder by stating: "I fully agree to the U.N. commander's stand which supports the freely elected constitutional government of Korea. I wish to make it emphatically clear that the U.S. upholds its support of the present government as the constitutional government of Korea elected by the people in the July elections last year."

These two statements by the U.S. authorities were generally believed as suspension orders to the coup forces to pull back. Since the forces had only 2 days' supply of ammunitions, gasoline and other equipments, and relying entirely on U.S. supplies, anxiety began to waver the ranks

of the coup forces and success of the coup became skeptical.

Washington Hesitates. Washington, however, took a different attitude. AP reported: "The State Department seems to be skeptical about Green's statement. Officials say that they must, first of all, find out why Green thought it needful to issue such a statement. Some even revealed that Gen. Magruder and Green may have blundered in doing so." Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles told the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee: "As the situation in Korea is fluid and un-elucidating, the U.S. cannot as yet give any assessment on the outlook." The State Department was having a hard time analyzing the situation.

To give immediate support to the military coup would bring harsh criticism from abroad. But to suppress the coup with U.S. forces would be worse. So, the State Department decided to wait and see how Premier Chang, the army in front lines, and students would react. On this U.S. confusion, Washington correspondent of Tokyo Shimbun wrote: "The American officials in Seoul, expecting Premier Chang and other political leaders might come in need to call on the people and ROK armed forces, were prepared to offer them U.S. printing and broadcasting facilities. But not a single soul approached the U.S. Embassy. Instead, government and political leaders continued telephoning the U.N. command to get news on the developments. Meanwhile, President Kennedy who was just leaving for Canada, heard reports from Acting Secretary of State McConnaughy and Chairman of Joint Chief of Staffs, Gen. Lemnitzer. The President is said to have asked: 'Where in the world is Premier Chang?' But the two couldn't answer that, for even the U.S. Embassy in Seoul didn't know at that time."

Some experts say that if Premier Chang or some other leader had made appeals through radio broadcasts, commanders like Lee of the 1st Army would have come out in support of the Chang Government and change the tide of events "without the need of moving a single soldier" as Gen. Magruder said. But as the leaders did not show up, statements issued by Green and Magruder to save democracy, were left to die out.

President Kennedy is said to have scrapped a draft statement prepared by McConnaughy. On this, the Tokyo Shimbun commented: "It seems that the U.S., in view of its failures in Cuba and Laos, did not want to burn its hands again."

1st Army: Neutral. On front line army reactions, Tokyo Shimbun Seoul correspondent reported: "The Taegu area is said to be the district where sentiments for unification are the strongest. But, young officers stationed there broke loose and took hold of government offices in answer to Chang Do Yung's address. A detachment was sent by Gen. Magruder and order was restored at once. Owing to censorships, it gives one the impression that ROK forces throughout the country had risen. But, Korean forces stationed in the front lines and other major cities are assuming a very passive attitude. Though they are not willing to take part in the coup, they are at the same time in no mood to fight for the Chang Government."

Public Reaction. The Asahi Shimbun wrote: "The people seems to be in no mood to give cheers to the coup leaders." The Mainichi Shimbun: "The civilians are just looking on absent-mindedly." The Kyodo New Service: 'Seoul citizens are surprisingly calm." And the Yomiuri summed it up: "The majority of the people in the streets are worrying 'how are they going to put things under control', some students and rightests are viewing the coup as 'a thing that was bound to come sooner or later' and intellectuals are questioning 'what's the use of doing such thing anyway?"

In this way, reactions of the Chang Government, armed forces and the public were entirely passive.

Junta Encouraged. Encouraged by the passivity of their opponents, the Military Junta issued its Decree No. 4, completely defying the Magruder and Green statements. The contents of the decree were:

1) Seizure of all the functions of the Chang Government.

2) Dissolution of the House of Councillors, House of Representatives and all local legislatures.

3) Banning of all activities of political parties and social organizations.

4) Arrest of all the ministers and vice-ministers of the Chang Government.

5) Operations of all the functions of the state by military junta members.

6) Normalization of all operations of government installations and prohibition on acts of violence.

The Junta followed up with Decree No. 5 and, at the same time, forced President Yun to appear in a special radio broadcast and made him call on Premier Chang and his Cabinet members to come out of hiding.

U.S. Calculation. Why did the U.S. fall back from its original stand and eventually recognize the coup as a fait accompli? The reasons for this shiftover are: Firstly, because the strong anti-communist line advocated by the junta, coincided with the greatest interest U.S. has in Korea. Secondly, the U.S. deemed that it might again lose its prestige, if the U.S. treated the coup leaders as traitors and thus invited a civil strife and there was also this fear that the generals might spill everything and reveal the fact that the U.N. command and the U.S. Embassy had given prior consent to stage such coup.

So, the U.S. forsook Premier Chang and worked in the direction to bring the situation under control. It appears that from this moment, the U.S. is capitalizing on the practical judgment that the militarists would do better in strengthening the anti-Communism structure of Korea.

Non-intervention. However, on May 17th, Green reiterated his stand in support of the Chang Government and after conferring with Gen. Magruder stated: "I have nothing to add to my previous statement. I still believe in it." Washington did not agree. State Department Spokesman Joseph Reap declared: "American troops in Korea have not and will not, be involved in any way. The U.S. officials in Seoul are in contact with both the Military Junta and the Chang Government." Non-intervention policy was decided on by Washington. This was decisive, for the 1st Field Army, on which the success or failure of the coup depended, cast away its neutral stand and came in to support the coup. The Chicago Daily correspondent wrote: "At 4.30 in the afternoon of May 17, Gen. Magruder conferred with Gen. Lee who has 400,000 troops under his command, and got him to promise "neutrality." Within 20 minutes after Magruder left, a member of the Junta came to see Lee and, perhaps, during that night Lee capitulated in favor of the revolution. Thus the last hope of Magruder to put down the revolution was lost."

The other forces followed suit. During the same night, the chief of staffs of the three forces held an emergency meeting and agreed to give an all-out support to the coup. So, on May 18th, Acting Secretary of State Bowles told reporters: "The situation in Korea is settling down. The U.S., I think, will recognize the new Korean Government."

Chang Emerges From Hiding. A little past noon of May 18. Premier Chang emerged at the State Council Building, accompanied by his American administrative counsellor Donald Whittaker. After a cabinet meeting with his ministers, the Premier decided to capitulate. And at 1.30 P.M., he announced through the radio: "We hereby resign from our respective posts, gravely taking moral and political responsibility for the situation in the current coup d'etat. We hope that the new government will effectually execute the functions of the state by steadfastly upholding the policy of anti-Communism."

Through this formality, the junta got the government transferred "legally." This procedure provided a pretext for the U.S. to recognize the junta. On this, the AP wired: "American sources in Seoul have revealed that the U.S. dilenma whether to recognize the military government or not. was solved by Premier Chang's formal capitulation and President Yun's decision to remain in office, which has eliminated the sticky problem of formal recognition by foreign nations."

President Yun's Resistance. Following Chang's resignation, the junta expanded its membership to 30 men and nominated 2 counsellors. Breakdown of the membership were: Army, 25; Marines, 3; Navy, 1 and Air Force, 1. On May 19th, the junta held its first full session and decided to call the junta "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction." But at 8 P.M. that day, President Yun suddenly announced that he was resigning. The President had worked to find a compromise between the Chang Government and the militarists but as the hope was lost, he deemed it better to resign. This perhaps was the only little resistance capable for the President to display.

For the junta, this meant loss of the only remaining constitutional state function. Fears of giving an impression of illegality of the military regime abroad, especially to the U.S., arose. The President's move, on the other hand, perplexed the Americans. According to the Yomiuri Shimbun correspondent, the U.S. Embassy, after consultation with Washington, advised the junta with a 4-point plan to devise a constitutional way out of the difficulty. So the junta put pressure on President Yun and finally at 5 P.M. of the following day, made the President announce his withdrawal of the resignation.

All Military Cabinet. On the same afternoon, the Supreme Council announced the formation of a new 15 man military Cabinet. Chang Do Yung became "Chief" of the Cabinet with 12 ministers, a cabinet and an information secretariat under him. All cabinet ministers were Army men save for token representation by the air force, navy and marines. Besides Lt. Gen. Kim Hong-il picked for foreign minister, all were in active service.

The military cabinet was officially installed at the former National Assembly building which now is the headquarters of the Supreme Council. In a speech to his Cabinet, Chang Do Yung listed five objectives:

1) Strengthen the anti-Communism structure and establish a genuine democratic Republic.

2) Uphold the United Nations, abide by international agreements and further friendly ties with allies.

3) Root out corruption and establish a fresh social atmosphere and thus increase the national patriotic spirit.

4) Raise the over-all standards of living by developing the national economy through good planning.

5) Strive for national reunification by excelling in competition against the communists.

Double-faced Attitude of the U. S. On May 22, the U.S. Government made clear its formal stand on the South Korean coup by stating: "Although it is highly regrettable that the military had taken over the civilian government in Korea, the objectives which the Supreme Council has listed, upholding the United Nations, promising social reform and return to constitutional system, are creditable. The U.S. Government, furthermore, expresses its full support to the U.S. representative in Korea for upholding its support of the Chang Government."

This double-faced attitude of expressing "regret" and "credit" at the same time to the South Korean military regime seems to indicate the real line of President Kennedy's foreign policy.

IV. THE OPPRESSIVE MEASURES OF THE COUP REGIME

Dissolution of Political Parties and Mass Arrests. From the very first hours of the coup, the militarists have carried out atrocious crackdowns on the potential opposition. By the decree that banned formation of anti-state organizations and Decree No. 6, issued on May 22, which dissolved all political parties and social organizations, the militarists disbanded 15 political parties, 230 labor, youth and student organizations. And during the five days from May 16, they arrested a total of 2,014 persons, including 70 students, 536 teachers and professors, 606 politicians, 255 social organization leaders and 14 news reporters.

The arrests were made indiscriminately. Commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Army were put away in jails for showing reluctance in supporting the coup. Students, professors and labor leaders who had led the unification movements were accused as pro-Communists and spies. Besides the ministers of the Chang Government, leaders of the National Assembly like House Speaker, Kwak Shang Hoon and Vice Speaker, Su Min-Ho were locked up in unidentified prisons.

The terrorizing arrests went on. Finance Minister Kim Yung Sun, Minister without Portfolio, Kim Sun Tae and others were nabbed on June 10 on charges of spying for the North Koreans but the junta did not give any evidence. These arrests are made without any warrants and no assurances of trial or safety are given to the jailed. And on June 14th, the nation was literally shocked to know that Dr. Lee Hun-kyu, United Socialist councillor, had suddenly died in prison.

Curb on Civil Liberties. As soon as the militarists took over, bans were put on social gatherings and overseas travel, freeze on bank credits and censorship on presses. Then on May 22, the junta suspended the Constitution which put an end to all civil liberties.

Besides hoodlums, black marketeers and smugglers, citizens who seemed malcontents in the eyes of the militarists were marched into jails as "anti-revolutionaries." Some 20,000 civil servants were fired from the government by such reasons as evading military service, having concubines and corruption. Another 20,000 is to be turned out by early July.

Stepping up the junta's crackdown on schools, the militarists summoned the heads of the nation's 65 colleges and universities on June 9, and ordered students, professors and teachers to stay out of political activities and labor unions. The militarists said that students were "self-conceited with pseudo-heroism" and should go back to their campuses and study hard.

The militarists cannot rest until they've clamped the nation into iron chains. On June 10, they launched what they called "National Reconstruction Movement." The movement has not only set the moral codes which the people must follow but the movement is to be organized down to the family level. It resembles the totalitarian system forced by the Japjanese militarists on their nation during World War II.

Clamp Down on the Presses. Free press is the greatest threat to dictators. Censorship was immediately imposed on newspapers, broadcasts and news services, and even on foreign presses. The only progressive Seoul daily, Minjok Ilbo, was closed down at once and all its officers were thrown into jails. The militarists ordered: no news must 1) aid the enemy 2) go against the military revolution 3) impair the public order 4) harm the public opinion and national sentiment 5) weaken the military morale or 6) reveal military secrets. Then on May 23, restrictions were placed on publications and news services.

Those newspapers not having their own printing facilities and news agencies not having contracts with overseas news services were all liquidated, which resulted in closing down of 70 newspapers and 170 news agencies. (There were 170 newspapers and 180 news agencies.)

The U.S. magazines, Time and News Week (May 24th issue) were taken off the news stalls for writing the truth about the coup. When Chang Do Yung was refused his visit to the U.S. by the State Department, not a single word was allowed to be printed about it. The militarists have not as yet the wiliness to tell lies like Hitler, but on May 20th, a Japanese correspondent was threatened to death by a Korean army officer who charged that his newspaper had published a story unfavorable to the coup.

On June 5, a reporter of the Tong-a Ilbo was arrested for writing after an interview with President Yun: "The President expressed hope that the military junta will transfer the government back to civilian authorities before the next session of the U.N. General Assembly which commences in Sept." It is darkness that reigns in Korea now.

Cruelest Law in History. To counter "anti-revolutionary" and subversive activities, the junta set up on June 13, a "Central Intelligence Agency" with headquarters in Seoul. The agents of this agency is given investigation powers independent of the prosecutors which means that they can act without being restricted by habeas corpus.

On June 20, the junta then promulgated the "Special Law for Disciplining Violence" by which demonstrations and riots will be meted out with punishments up to death. And to crown it all, the "Retroactive Law to Punish Special Offenses" was enforced on June 22. This is about the cruelest law in modern history. The notorious National Security Law enacted by Syngman Rhee is lenient by a mile. The law stipulates that ministers and parliamentary members who have offended national interests, those persons who deliberately obstructed the military revolution, leaders of political parties or social organizations and their collaborators who have committed insurrectionary activities will be meted out with severe punishments up to death. With this law, the militarists are expected to prosecute leaders of the deposed government, from Premier Chang on down on charges of pro-Communist dealings."

The most terrifying point of this expost facto law is that offenses committed during the past three and a half years or since Dec. 23, 1957 are punishable. This date corresponds to the period when movements for peaceful unification led by the Progressive Party (its leader Cho Bong-Am was executed in 1959 by Syngman Rhee on false charges of spying for the Communists), made big gains. And from October, 1958, Premier Chang's Democratic Party also carried peaceful unification in its platform. So the real intent of the militarists in devising this law, is said to be aimed at getting rid—even annihiliating by capital punishment, these forces who constitute the biggest threat to them.

At any rate, the tyranny of the militarists far surpass that of dictator Syngman Rhee. They resort to tyranny not because they have confidence in their military power, but because they are afraid of the people.

V. TRUE CHARACTER OF THE COUP

Counter-revolution. In short, the recent coup was but a counter-revolution by which the militarists have usurped the government. It was not a revolution in the true sense of the word. As stated above, the motives of the coup originated from personal ambitions of generals Chang and Pak who had been pushed to the walls.

In the first decree issued by the Revolutionary Military Junta, the coup leaders stated that the army arose because it "could no longer leave the destiny of the nation in the hands of corrupt and incompetent politicians" and was going to "surmount the national crisis" by taking over the government. These words, in fact, were used to conceal their real motives. Corruption, no doubt, is a disease widely spread in Korea, but the army is the most corrupt sector of the nation and Gen. Chang is the worst among rotten generals.

Total Flunks As Soldiers. Chang and Pak are not competent even as soldiers. During the Korean War, as chief of the intelligence bureau, Chang Do Yung proved a total flunk, for he completely miscalculated the military potential of the North Koreans. And Pak, who was then vice chief of the strategic staff, could not work a single effective defense strategy to stem the onrushing North Koreans. Now, what can possibly be expected from them as rulers of the country?

Double Talk. In its first decree, the military junta listed 6 points as its objectives. The beautiful words used there, however, are nothing but frauds, trying to sell vinegar by calling it wine! While committing to strengthen the anti-Communism structure in objective (1), the junta is indiscriminately suppressing freedom when it should be promoting it if the junta is bent on fighting Communism. As to objective (2), defying their talk about respecting the U.N. Charter, the coup leaders have resorted to violence in order to usurp the government and are trampling on human rights as they like; instead of abiding by international agreements, they have ignored such things (Against the Taijon Agreement, the junta has fired and detained the 1st Army commander, Lt. Gen. Lee Han Lin, 2nd Army commander, Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong Nok and Superintendent of the ROK Military Academy, Lt. Gen. Kang Yung-Hoon, without the recognition of the U.N. commander.); and against their promise to further friendship with allies, the militarists have suspended the Constitution, wilfully dissolved the National Assembly and have set up a military dictatorship which is a system totally contrary to democratic systems of the free world. In regards to objective (3), betraying their fine talks about wiping out corruption, the militarists have been doing everything they can to conceal their own corruption and ill conducts of the past, and while advertising to boost the national patriotic spirit, they are indulging in tyranny. As regards objective (4), they have said to resolve the hardships of poverty-ridden farmers and unemployed, but they haven't put forth a single drastic measure in that direction, nor have they put up any far-reaching programme that will develop a self-sustaining economy as they say. If the coup leaders are going to face a showdown with the Communists as they bluff in objective (5), such would only perpetuate the present divided state of Korea. And lastly, as to their promise to return the government to civilian authorities (objective 6), the militarists have changed their promise and ceased to talk about it and are bent on solidifying a long-ranged military dictatorship.

Therefore, it is all too clear that these big and flowery words are downright lies. Simple as they are, the generals think that they can lure or force the people to cooperate in strengthening anti-Communism. But, how in the world are they going to strengthen anti-Communism and resolve the economic difficulties of South Korea at the same time? Isn't it enough that Syngman Rhee and Chang Myun had failed in that attempt? The results are plain; for, as long as Korea remains divided, to better economic life in South Korea is an impossibility.

Feudal Magistrates. The military dictatorial regime have enforced such decrees as control on profiteering, pegging of price ceilings, transfer of 200 million hwan from the National Budget to poverty relief, release of government stocked rice,

abolishment of high interest debts, ban on foreign tobaccos, roundup of hoodlums, etc. Their childish aim is to attract the people, but such measures recall to us the ways of feudal magistrates, which being in want of consistency, will, in no ways, help in bettering the people's hard lot.

Neo-Fascists. To crown it all, the militarists are clamping down on civil liberties like true dictators. They have liquidated all the organizations for unification and thrown every known campaigner for unification into prisons. They've even locked up conservative politicians, military chiefs and professors in fear that they might become serious contenders to their ruling power. Furthermore, all political and social organizations were dissolved, ban put on all political and student activities, censorship on press and suspension on overseas travel. All this enforced in the name of "obstructing indirect aggression", fully reveals the dictatorial nature of the coup leaders. Thus the militarists have served as hangman of democratic Korea. The "Second Republic" of Korea have been devastated and we see, emerged from this far-off corner of Asia, a new group of Fascists.

IV. OUTLOOK ON THE FUTURE OF THE COUP REGIME

Although the military regime has promised to transfer the government to new and conscientious politicians and suggested holding general elections, the militarists seem far from doing so, and are devising all sorts of measures to secure a long-term rule. However, there exists little assurance that their designs would succeed. For, various factors, both internal and external, are working against them. The major internal factors are: 1) intra-junta friction and factional strife, 2) retaliations of generals relieved of their posts and thrown into prisons by the junta, and 3) people's resistance.

Intra-junta Friction and Factional Strife. The battle for supremacy between Chang and Pak factions had been going on ever since the formation of the military junta. On June 9th, a permanent committee was set up within the Supreme Council, and Pak who took over the chairmanship, virtually grasped the ruling reigns of the country. This committee is the organ in charge of administrating the projects of the Supreme Council. It has 7 sub-committees (judicial, home affairs foreign affairs, defense, financial and economic, transportation and communications, and management and planning) and majority of the chairmanship is in the hands of Pak men. On June 8. Chang had to give up his two other posts of army chief of staff and defense minister. He gradually lost power and was finally ousted from the junta in July 3, resigning the chairmanship of the Supreme Council to Pak and premiership to Lt. Gen. Song Yo Chan. In this way, the Pak faction is winning out in the intra-junta fight but there still are other elements within to cause similiar frictions.

Retaliation of Detained Generals. The number of generals who are detained in prisons amount to more than 50. The big figures are: Lt. Gen. Lee Hal-lim (ex-commander 1st Army), Lt. Gen. Choe Sok (ex-commander 3rd Army) and Lt. Kyung Nok (ex-comdr. 2nd Army) and Lt. Gen. Kang Yong-hun (ex-commandant of the Military Academy). By getting rid of these powerful generals, the coup leaders hoped to secure their hold on the armed forces. But, the outrageousness of the measure is backfiring on them. The officers and men of the 1st and 2nd Armies are said to be taking repulsive attitudes towards the junta. The ex-commandant of the Military Academy, Lt. Gen. Kang possesses wide influence among young officiers.

Although there are no signs of the junta releasing these generals, discontent is mounting within the army for detaining them so long. In time, the coup leaders will be placed in a tight spot regarding the treatment of these deposed generals, for whether in prison or out, they will join hands to fight back.

People's Resistance. Due to severe crack down operations, the people cannot, as yet, stage any organized resistance. But as hatred mounts and hardships deepen under the dictatorship and incompetent administration of the militarists, the people will arise as they did last year. Then will the militarists be taught who are the real masters of the nation.

The international factors which are working against the military regime are as follows: legality of the military government will be questioned at the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly, 2) U.S. pressure on the military regime 3) disrepute among world opinion. As 2 and 3 are factors in no need of explanation, we will here deal only with factor 1.

United Nations Debate. The legality of the military government will undoubtedly be questioned in the coming U.N.'s Korean debate. Since the North Koreans are likely to attend the debate too, the U.S. and its allies will have headaching time in defending the undemocratic military government of Korea. The following are the likely points to be questioned:

1) The legality of the South Korean military regime delegation.

2) The command question of the U.N. forces in Korea.

3) The character of the U.N. forces in Korea.

4) The continuation of U.N. Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

ROK Governments have thus far claimed that it was the only legitimate government of Korea recognized by the U.N. For grounds, the U.N. resolution adopted on Dec. 12, 1948, was always quoted. By this resolution, the ROK Government was recognized by the world organization as the only legitimate government of Korea elected through the free will of the majority of the Korean people.

As the U.N. Temporary Commission sent to Korea in January, 1947 for the purpose of establishing a united government, was barred from entering North Korea, the U.N. Interim Committee adopted on Feb. 26, 1948 a resolution "to hold general elections in such parts of Korea as possible." This resolution, futhermore, specified that the legitimate government must be based on general elections supervised by the U.N And since the above mentioned General Assembly resolution, the legality of the new military regime which seized the lawful government by violence is bound to heat up a hot debate.

The Command Question. Since the U.S. military forces in Korea are still using the title of U.N. forces, the responsibility of the U.N. Command in allowing the ROK forces under its command to destruct democracy with violence, is likely to be inquired by the U.N. At the ame time, the question whether to let the U.S. forces maintain the title of U.N. forces, might come up in the debate. This point has already been questioned, and some nations have argued that the U.S. should resign the title. The grounds for this argument are: 1) The U.S. had already decided on sending U.S. occupation forces in Japan to Korea and had given orders to its navy and air forces before the U.N. Security Council decided on taking repressive actions against the agression of the North Koreans. 2) The U.S. have used the title of U.N. for the purpose of defending its own policies 3) The U.S. worked on the United Nations to obtain the use of title and flag of the United Nations to give the highest authority to its operations 4) The U.N. Command Headquarters was always identical with that of the U.S. Far Eastern Command and as the line of command in which Gen. MacArthur recieved his orders was the U.S. president, secretary

(Continued on Page 25)

THE AWAKENING OF ANTI-MILITARIST STRUGGLE

The militarists who seized the ROK Government possess all the features of fascists. The conceited coup leaders think they can subject the people into a dictatorship. But, Koreans who overthrew Dictator Syngman Rhee will never sicken under any iron rule.. Although anti-militarist movement is but awakening as yet, many forecast that Koreans will in time arise again to throw out the tyrants.

QUIET RESISTANCE

On the day of the takeover, the U.N. Command commented that the Korean people were not supporting the coup. Well may it have been so, for the public at that time had placed big hopes on unification which was just starting to roll. On May 20th, South Korean students were to start on their march to Panmunjom to attend the North-South Student Conference. Both North and South Korean people looked forward to this Conference to make a breakthrough to unification. It was at then that the militarists staged the takeover and clipped away the people's aspiration.

So, the people can hardly get in the mood to co-operate with the militarists. As the crack down operations of the military junta are so severe, the people cannot, by any means, attempt organized resistance as yet. Nevertheless, the people are assuming an attitude of quiet resistance against the military regime.

Students' Rally (Tokyo)

A Seoul university student volunteered to speak the real mind of ROK students to a Japanese correspondent (Asahi Shimbun). The student said: "since the militarists have arrested some 30 students just for advocating North-South exchange, I certainly will not work with them." The militarists consider the students biggest threats to their power. They have been persistently cracking down on schools, arresting so many students and professors and have banned students from participating in any political activity. But, it must be remembered that it were the students that powered the revolution last year and that guns and tanks cannot supress freedom so long.

Politicians, statesmen and diplomats are

not willing to cooperate either. The ROK ambassadors to Washington and the United Nations resigned without any delay. They rapped the army generals as power-hungry militarists and criticized that the coup "was obviously against the will of the people."

President Yun, when forced by the militarists to withdraw his resignation, told them that he would remain in office provided that the "junta will abide by democratic rules." Nevertheless, the militarists went on with their work to set up a long-ranged military dictatorship. So, President Yun, in a press interview, expressed his hope that "the military junta will transfer the government back to civilian authorities before the next session of the U.N. General Assembly which commences in September." This may be about the maximum resistance possible for the president under the circumstances.

The ROK Supreme Court was the last bulwark of democracy remaining before the onslaught of the militarists. But, this too was put under the control of the military junta through the 'Emergency Law" promulgeted on June 6th. In protest against such dictatorial outrage, acting chief of justice Pai Chyung Hyun and four remaining justices resigned enmasse on June 8th. In such manner, anti-military movements in South Korea are at present taking a form of passive and quiet resistance.

NORTH KOREAN REACTION

The North Koreans were, more or less, taken by surprise at the sudden takeover of the South Korean Government. By May 20th, however, they regained their composure and mass protest rallies were held in all major cities in demonstration against the South Korean militarists. In the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, over 200,000 people marched enmasse denouncing the coup as a "brutal intrigue schemed by the American imperialists," and called on the South Korean people to "establish a government based on true interests of the people and soldiers and to persevere in the common struggle to unify the fatherland."

On May 23, North Korean labor delegates, joined by labor delegations from Japan, Burma, Ceylon, Mali Republic, Togo, Guinea and Cuba currently visiting there, issued a joint statement condemning the U.S. for "instigating the ultra-fascist elements of the ROK army to stage an aggressive coup d'etat," and appealed to labor forces of the world to "fight these fascists who are a challenge not only to democracy but humanity itself."

In this way, the entire nation of North Korea is being summoned to fight the South Korean fascists and the movements thus far for "independent and peaceful unification" have switched their goals to bring down the South Korean military regime first.

ANTI-MILITARIST STRUGGLE QUICKENING IN JAPAN

Korean residents here in Japan might become the central force to liberate the homeland from the stranglehold of the military fascists. Some 600,000 Koreans reside today in Japan. They are divided in two giant organizations: the pro-ROK Mindan (Republic of Korea Resident's Union) and the pro-Communist Chosen Chong Ryun (General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan). The movements of these organizations, particularly that of Korean students belonging to the Mindan, are to be watched.

The Mindan in a rally on May 16th, supported the military takeover on condition that the militarists return the Government to civilian hands as soon as possible. However, a group of Korean students belonging to the Federation of Republic of Korea Students Studying in Japan, a substructure of the Mindan, denounced the

coup on the following day, as a "reactionary dictatorship trampling on the spirit of the April Revolution and strangling the national aspiration for unification." Then, the Federation (3,000 members) assembled on May 27th, and formally declared its opposition to the military ROK Government.

The Mindan, whose leaders are following a line in support of the military regime, started manuevering to suppress the students. The leaders charged that the students were acting too impetuously, instigated by communist elements and demanded the Federation to withdraw its declaration. And, on pretext that the Federation had gone beyond limits to aid the enemy, they suspended all financial assistance to the student sub-structure.

Thus ROK students vs. Mindan leaders conflict have now come out into the open. ROK student groups in numerous universities have assembled under the wings of the Federation and are determined to face a showdown with the pro-militarist Mindan officers. This struggle against the ROK militarist government and the Mindan leaders, as a matter of fact, have completely awakened the ROK students in Japan from their heretofore passivity. As stated in their declaration, the students are determined to spearhead the struggle to defend democracy and realize unification in place of the students of the homeland who are completely bereft of their freedom to talk or act.

Meanwhile, the North Korean Chosen Chong-Ryun has also moved into action. At its national rally held from May 23rd, the Chong-Ryun issued a statement rapping the Chang Do Yung faction, a "group of fascists working as agents of the American imperialists." Then on May 25th, 2,500 Chong-Ryun members marched to the American Embassy in Tokyo and presented to the Embassy and President Kennedy, protests demanding immediate evacuation of U.S. troops from Korea. And furthermore, on June 13th, Chong-Ryun requested the political parties and social organizations of Japan to withhold the reopening of the ROK-Japan negotiations while the brutal fascists are ruling South Korea.

SUPPORT FROM OVERSEAS

Support and sympathy to the Korean people's cause is being expressed throughout the world. The Secretariat of the World Students' League sent appeals to its members on May 22nd and called to organize a united front with such international organizations like the World Peace Committee, the Afro-Asian Conference and other world youth leagues to help the South Korean youths; to protest to the military ROK government for holding the South Korean students back from exchanging with North Korean students; and to demand the immediate pull out of U.S. armed forces from Korea.

The Secretariat of the World Federation of Democratic Youths' League also announced a statement on May 23, and protested against the South Korean military dictatorship. The Secretariat also sent appeals to its member leagues throughout the world to forward their active support to the South Korean youths' struggle against the fascists.

Finally, Kim Yong Joung head of Korean Problem Research Institute in Washington and powerful advocate for neutralization of Korea, has condemned the coup as a "power-grabbing action by hotheaded junior officers of the ROK army" and warned that "as long as the militarists resort to such unlawfulness, they will never be able to face a showdown with the Communists."

Although it must be said that anti-militarist struggle is but dawning as yet, a swift undercurrent can be felt running which will eventually burst to the surface and rush on the fascists. As economic deterioration and social unrest are mounting each day under the incompetent rule of the military junta, it is believed by many quarters that the Korean people will arise before long to sweep away the dictators.

DECLARATION

Issued by the Federation of ROK Students Studying in Japan (May 27)

Thanks to the bloods shed by patriotic students of our homeland last year, democracy had finally begun to bud in South Korea and we were watching it grow in the many patriotic movements whose eventual goals were set on unifying the divided fatherland. We, Korean students in Japan, while enduring the hardships of studying abroad, have been dearly watching our people courageously taking up the numerous challenges. It was truly heartbreaking to look on at the political and economic distresses that set in on South Korea. We, of course, had no intention of rejecting the difficult but glorious tasks which our fatherland have expected us to fulfill, but since we have set our aims to work for our country in the future when our time should come, we have concentrated our energy in our studies.

Still, the regrets and compunctions of not participating in the April Revolution of last year is gnawing at our hearts. Oppressed by the irritation to do something for our fatherland, and suffering under the conditions that bar such actions, we have been impatiently watching the slow march of democracy in Korea.

But now, to our greatest regrets, a military coup d'etat has brutally devastated the budding of South Korean democracy and we see the brave cries for unification dying out before the violent storms of tyranny. Dark shades of fascism is again clouding the skies of Korea. And many a courageous work that have been accomplished to heighten the glory of the nation is being swept away by the cruel winds of militarism.

Now, fellow students! in such an emergency, can we shut ourselves up in ivory towers and abstain from doing anything? If such an attitude is taken, we will not only defile the glorious tradition and pride of the Korean students who had studied in Japan and spearheaded the March 1st Korean uprising back in 1919, but we will also be despised as cowards forever.

It's time for us to rise! We must arise to substitute as speakers for the students of our homeland now bereft of their freedom to speak up. We must also act as their replacements and fulfill the tasks our fellow students were pursuing. These are the duties which our 30 million brethrens are looking forward on us to accomplish. We should now arrest the initiative from the students belonging to the Chosen Chong-Ryun who are all sick with too much leftist doctrine, and lead the patriotic movements to save our fatherland.

The first task we must undertake is to liberate our homeland from the military boots and bayonets and restore freedom and democratic order in Korea. Let us, here, launch our anti-militarist march to recover democracy by accumulating in our ranks the support of all the Koreans residing here in Japan!

Then, we must reject all the inconsistent politicians, and by unhesitatingly assuming the mission to spearhead the movements to save our fatherland, let's display the patriotism burning within us!

Fellow students! Let's take up our arms to bring down the military dictatorship and restore freedom and democracy in South Korea in line with the spirit of the April Revolution! ROK students in Japan, let's live up to the expectations of our 30 million brethrens!

Weak Points In Coup Regime's Econ. Policies

The economic reconstruction plans outlined by the S. Korean military junta are but reprints of the policies advocated by the deposed Chang government. The militarists hope to save the crumbling economy by a package of reform measures which they call the "Basic Economic Policies." But, experts on Korea agree that ROK economy is unsalvagable unless solution is sought through unification of both Koreas. And as depression is deepening, economic difficulties may eventually prove fatal to the militarists' rule.

CRITICAL EYES OF THE PUBLIC

The South Korean public, confused at first by the surprise takeover, looked with mixed feelings of consent and suspect at what the militarists were saying and doing. But now that the military junta has completely run out of its publicity stunts like rounding up of hoodlums, cleaning up of slums, suspension of farmers' debts, etc., they are viewing the militarists with more critical eyes—especially with an eye on what the militarists are going to do about the economic chaos.

In respect to economic reconstruction, the junta, in its 6 point objective issued on the day of the takeover, declared to root out corruption and thus further the national spirit and to raise the overall standard of living by developing the national economy. As a matter of fact, the Chang Government, at its inauguration last year, promised the same and did give a try at developing the country's resources only to fail in three months' time. And in regards to corruption, the Chang Government, inspite of its promise to the people who had put Chang into the ruling position, had to sabotage the prosecutions of illegal fortune-makers during the Syngman Rhee regime because it was indebted to those profiteers and had dirtied its own hands with corruption. This incompetence and corruption brought public wrath on the Chang Government and thus provided a pretext for the militarists to take over.

MISSING THE MARK

Since takeover, the military junta has enforced such economic measures as release of operation funds to farmers, suspension of collecting high interest debts from farmers and fishermen, pegging of price ceilings at the May 15th level, transfer of National Assembly appropriations to civilian relief, mass firing of civil servants etc. Illusioned by the catchword "revolutionary", some intellectuals were so rash and optimistic as to express immediate support.

As the saying goes, it is easier to preach than practice. Release of operation funds to farmers, in fact, is a measure which the Chang Government had already provided for in its approved Budget. But, the militarists, inspite of their enthusiasm, have not announced the detailed enforcement regulations that would actually enforce this measure as yet.

The decree suspending collection of high interest debts is being enforced all right,

but in place of merely suspending them, the debts should have been totally abolished. Although the junta has promised to refund the high interest credits with Bank of Agriculture Bonds, it hasn't said a word about what's going to happen to the farmers' debts. Most probably, the farmers will get their interests reducted or exempted, but the government will take over as creditors. The government will then be in a position to collect the debts with as much power as collecting taxes. In that case, farmers and fishermen will have a much toughter party to cope with. And even if the farmers should be so lucky as to get the debts abolished, still they will not be free from high interest debts. For, poverty-ridden as they are, these rural people cannot, under present circustances, manage without borrowing money from someone.

The above measures, at any rate, are but dealing with trivial and peripheral problems. They only concern problems of economic control and transfer of national income. And the militarists will definitely miss the mark if they think these measures can help in reconstructing the cripled economy.

The most essential and urgent problem confronting ROK economy now is the question of how to raise the present level of national income. That is, we must find the way to raise the present low level up to standards befitting civilized nations. For this purpose, we must think out the best revision or reform to be done in the area of income and property distribution, and, furthermore, pursue the most effective means and methods of utilizing the nation's resources. The junta, so far, has done hardly anything in this direction of raising the national income.

BASIC ECONOMIC POLICIES: REPRINTS OF CHANG'S PLANS

On May 31, the junta announced what it called its "Basic Economic Policies." In short, these policies are but reprints of Chang Myun's economic plans, which were endorsed with the catchphrase "Reconstruction first, then unification." The militarists' plans list only vague goals and are in want of concrete measures. We will now see what the militarists have in their basket and analyze the contents.

FISCAL POLICY: MASS FIRING AND STRICT TAXES

The militarists declare, in their "Basic Economic Policies," that they are going to "cut down on unneccessary spending and attain high economic growth by pouring the savings into industrial development projects." Although direct and indirect defense expenditures occupy 70% of the National Budget, the militarists haven't the slightest intention of curtailing defense spending, which is about the only reasonable item to save on. Instead, they are cutting down on personnel expenditure. Some 10,000 civil servants are being fired on charges of evading military service, and many more are to be discharged on equally haphazard reasons. So, the militarists are trying to do a little saving at the expense of civil servants by not only firing them but also forcing more work with less wages on those who are lucky to fare the purges.

In regards to revenues, the junta's policy is to "grasp revenues accurately and establish a fair and reasonable tax system which will serve in boosting industrial development." According to these words, tax collections will become strict and financial aids will lean heavily towards interests which the militarists will have to rely on most. Since this "fair and reasonable" tax system is to help industrial development, preference will be given to big businesses. This tax reform, therefore, is aimed at enforcing strict tax collection on medium and small businesses and the working class.

FINANCIAL POLICY: MOBILZATION OF FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS

As to financial policy, the junta promises to "eliminate favoritism and monopoly and promote the public interest first." Favoritism and monopoly prevailing in financial circles were build up by the Rhee regime, and financial interests have been knit closely to government policies. So, inspite of the talk of reshaping the financial system in line with democratic management, the reshaping will only amount to mobilization of the financial forces in the direction of strengthening the military regime.

INDUSTRIAL POLICY: EMPTY PROMISES

The militarists put emphasis on promoting development of agriculture, fishery and key industries (electricity, coal, oil refining, fertilizers, and steel) through long-ranged development plans. And for this, the following measures are to be taken: 1) step-up of survey work 2) improvement of technology 3) rationalization of farm products 4) promotion of land development and afforestation projects 5) farm management guidance 6) furtherance of self-regulated development of medium and small businesses 7) expansion of importing agencies, and 8) adjustment of high interest debts of farmers and fishermen.

So far, so good. But, where in the world will the militarists get the money to finance all this? They cannot, by any means, provide the funds for all these projects by just firing civil servants. And, moreover, electricity, for example, is a problem unsolvable both technically and from the standpoint of resources. So the militarists, like their predecessors, are looking forward to foreign aids. But, since the dollar crisis, the Americans have been gradually decreasing foreign aids, and bulk of the aids coming into Korea is now taking the form of U.S. surplus farm products. The militarists probably wouldn't mind what form the aids might take. Still, if they are going to bring in increased quantities of surplus farm products to provide the funds for these projects, exactly how are they going to raise the present cheap prices of domestic agricultural products to reasonable levels as they say?

So, this industrial development plan is but an empty promise that would only lead the nation into worse distress. And since the plan is based on perpetuating the division of Korea, it goes against the true interests of the nation.

POPULATION AND INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION: AN IMPOSSSIBILITY

The junta is planning decentralization of idle labor power and factories by deploying them in rural areas. The militarists should know that it's not want of idle labor power but lack of industrial environment in rural districts that brings factories into cities. As long as the burden of excessive defense spending is not lifted from the country, build up of transportation facilities and power sources to ensure construction of factories in rural areas is an impossibility. On the other hand, the unemployed is in danger of being round up into compulsory labor. The militarists have put the hoodlums to work in public works as punishment for their evils done and they might be thinking of forcing the unemployed to work under similar conditions of slave labor. The militarists are boasting that they have cleaned the streets of Seoul of vagrants, but the truth is that the jobless have fled lest they'd be round up to work at slave camps.

PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL FORTUNE-MAKERS: A FAKE

On may 28th, the Supreme Military Council for National Reconstruction (military junta) issued a decree setting the "basic principles" to deal with the prosecution of illegal fortune-makers, and announced, at the same time, that it had

arrested 25 leading businessmen, former government officials and ex-army generals.

Despite the publicity given, the public was not impressed. Although the people's wraths towards profiteers are far from being mitigated yet, they just scoffed at this measure as only a gesture of the militarists trying to appease the people. The public knows well that the militarists are no less guilty than the suspected in regards to corruption and illegal money-making.

The militarists are preaching to the people to boost national morals but how could the public take it seriously when the very words the militarists utter are so unreasonable and contradicting? The militarists have classified illegal fortune-makers into the following categories and decided to let go those rascals who were fortunate not to have made enough money! According to the Seoul daily, Hanguk Ilbo, illegal fortune-makers who passed the following limits are going to be prosecuted:

A) Civil servants who have illegally earned more than 50 million hwan.

B) Civilians who have:

1) purchased more than 300 thousand dollars of foreign exchange through illegal channels.

2) contributed more than 100 million hwan to political parties with money borrowed from financial organizations.

3) profited more than 200 million hwan through illegally acquired contracts of state and public projects or through illegal tenders on government goods.

4) earned proceeds of more than 100 million hwan through business transaction of state and public property.

5) monopolized the purchase and allotment of foreign exchange and made more than 200 million hwan in profits.

6) profited more than 200 million hwan by tax evasion.

In days under the rule of Syngman Rhee and Chang Myun, impoverished farmers and laborers who couldn't pay their taxes of no more than 1,000 hwan, were called rascals, beaten by clubs and thrown into jails. Bailiffs came along and served distress warrants on farm tools, kitchen utensils, cattle and even on chickens, and told the farmers and laborers to obey the law. Now, how could these embittered people forgive these profiteers who are to be exempt from prosecution on the technicality that they've not made 200 million hwan. (The Chang Government had put the price at 100 million.)

Furthermore, those who are to judge these illegal profiteers must have clean hands. But Chang Do Yung, chairman of the junta, is as notorious as any profiteer. He, in fact, is the ring-leader of corrupt generals, amassing enormous fortunes in the very midst of the Korean War.

.UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF:. SLAVE LABOR

Unemployment is the most urgent problem confronting Korea today. Even the public poll conducted by the military junta indicated 42.8% of the answerers requesting unemployment relief. This urgent and essential problem, however, is not given much emphasis by the militarists. The little they've referred to it in their "basic economic policies," is in relation with industrial development projects. But, with an appropriation of only 3 billion hwan for these projects, much cannot be expected. (In April, there were over 4 million people unemployed in urban districts alone.) If these development projects are the only area the militarists have in mind to create new jobs, those to be employed there will undoubtedly be made to work like slaves.

DEPRESSION DEEPENING

Thus we have shown how peripheral, short-sighted and irrelevant the economic policies outlined by the military junta are. Now, reports from Korea tell us that the militarists are failing in their attempts and depression deepening. The Asahi Shimbun (Japanese daily) Seoul correspondent has reported: "In a month's

duration, the militarists have somehow or rather build up a framework for military rule, but livelihood is not getting better On the contrary, due to confusions following the coup, depression has deepened and unemployment is growing. Commodity prices seem to be dropping but this is because of decrease in buying power. Big firms and plants are still inactive. And restaurants, tea rooms and department stores are shutting down." The Mainichi Shimbun (Japanese daily) correspondent wrote on June 16th in similar tones: "Some businesses are postponing pay day. . . Thousands of civil servants are being turned out. The three electricity companies are to be merged at last which will produce more unemployed. There are no opportunities to absorb these white-collared jobless."

HOPELESS FUTURE

Most experts on Korea agree that ROK economy has deteriorated beyond the point of repair. To salvage her economic distress, unification is the only way. As South Korea can never lift herself from her primitive agricultural state, she must look to industrialized North Korea, if she is really willing to rebuild her economy.

The militarists are attempting the same impossible, to build a self-sustaining economy that Syngman Rhee and Chang Myun had failed so disastrously. As they are in no position or mood to work with the North Koreans, perhaps they have no alternative. But, it is too clear that their labors will be lost. The future of ROK economy is quite hopeless.

Like their predecessor Chang, the militarists are pleading to be given "more time." But, time shall not help them. And no matter how much the militarists may lash their whips on the people or bring in aids from abroad, South Korean economy will always be slipping down the down curve. So, time instead will eventually ring the knell of the militarists.

FULL STORY

(Continued from Page 16)

of defense, chairman of the joint chief of staffs and army chief of staff, there were no spaces for U.N. initiative. At any rate, the outrageous conduct of the ROK army will be questioned in connection with this question, which will deal a hard blow on the military regime.

Question of the UNCURK. The U.N. Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation was sent to Korea to help in establishing a independent, democratic and united Korean government. Despite such mission, the Commission has just looked on while the ROK army devastated the democratic government and arrested campaigners for unification. The little it has done was on June 13th, nearly a month after the takeover, when it decided to request the military regime, "informally and seperately" to restore parliamentary system and civil liberties. On accounts of its ineffeciency, the Korean people had criticized it more harmful than good. This attitude of the UNCURK will undoubtedly be questioned, whereby it might be abolished.

As we have seen so far, factors, internal and external, are working against the militarists. And even if they do by chance, succeed in maintaining a long-term rule, that would only spell the doom of Korea and thus produce new troubles and tensions in Asia.

REQUEST

We shall be very happy it the Reader can send us his comments and opinions on the Korean problem and our periodical as well

(Editor)

S. KOREAN COUP AND UN's RESPONSIBILITY

U. N. FORCES AND THE UNCURK WERE SENT TO KOREA TO HELP AND SAFEGUARD THE LEGITIMATE ROK GOVERNMENT. STILL, THE MILITARISTS WERE ALLOWED TO SEIZE THAT GOVERNMENT. THESE U. N. AGENCIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF MUST TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVITING THIS DEPLORABLE SITUATION.

THREEFOLD RESPONSIBILITY

The most significant problem brought up by the sudden military takeover of the South Korean Government is the question of the responsibility of the "United Nations."

Presently, there are two U.N. agencies stationed in Korea. They are the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the United Nations Forces despatched respectively by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council. The U.N. Command in Korea, had all the ROK armed forces under its command ever since July 15, 1950 when U.N. Commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur and President Rhee signed the Taijon Agreement. Thanks to this agreement, it was generally believed that government takeovers by coup d'etats which became fashionable in under-developed countries, would not break out in South Korea despite the inevitability from social standpoints.

Still, in face of this supposed impossibility, a coup d'etat was staged by ROK armed forces belonging to the U.N. Command and the legitimate government of Korea which the United Nations had recognized and taken under its protection, was overthrown. This situation is continuing for more than a month and the establishment of the military regime is becoming a fait accompli. This is a grave matter not only for Korea but also for the United Nations and for the maintenance of international peace. Thus, we believe that the responsibility of inviting such predicament is bound to be questioned by the United Nations and at other grounds of international discussions.

The responsibility of the "United Nations" in connection with the South Korean military coup is not a singular responsibility. It is, in fact, threefold. For one, it is the responsibility which the U.N. Command must assume in allowing the ROK armed forces to carry out the coup and thus profane the authority of the United Nations through numerous wanton conducts done by the coup forces in the name of ROK Government. Secondly, it is the responsibility that must be blamed on the UNCURK for not taking adequate measures against the ROK coup forces when they overthrew the only legitimate government of Korea established through U.N. supervised democratic elections and were rampantly performing acts of tyranny totally outraging the spirit and mission of the United Nations. And thirdly, it is the responsibility which the U.N. General Assembly and the Sevcurity Council must take for sending these U.N. agencies to Korea.

THE TASKS AND CODES OF CONDUCT OF U.N. FORCES

The legal grounds for foreign forces in Korea to operate as U.N. Forces are provided by the U.N. Security Council Resolution (U.N. Document S-1588) adopted on July 7, 1950. Since a preceding resolution (U.N. Document S-1511) adopted by the Security Council on June 27, 1950, recommended the members of the United Nations to "furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area", this resolution further recommended in its paragraph 3 "the member nations contributing troops and other assistances, in accords with the foregoing U.N. Security Council resolution, to offer these troops and other assistances to the Unified Command under the United States" and "permitted the Unified Command to use, at its discretion, the United Nations flag along with the flags of those participating nations during combat with the North Korean forces." (Par. 5) The Security Council, moreover had resolved to send troops and other assistances to the Republic of Korea in its resolution (U.N. Document S-1501) adopted on June 25, 1950 (day the Korean War broke out).

The important point here is that the Security Council in adopting this resolution recalled "the declaration adopted by the General Assembly on Oct. 21, 1949" wherein the Assembly recognized the ROK Government as the legally established government "having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside" and also confirmed that "this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and were observed by the Temporary Commission, and that this is only such government in Korea."

The task of these U.N. Forces belonging to the U.N. Command under the U.S. (as mentioned above, the ROK armed forces were formally placed under U.N. Command as of July 14, 1950), was to assist this legitimate ROK Government in its work to repel the armed aggression and recover international peace and security in this area. It was impossible for the U.N. Forces to operate under the direct command of the Security Council since "special agreements" defined in Article 43 of the U.N. charter could not be arranged and a "military staff committee" provided in Article 47 set up. So the forces were formed according to "recommendations" provided in Article 39 and put under the command of the Unified Command under the U.S. Government. The U.S. was obliged to submit proper reports on the course of actions taken by the Unified Command in line with Paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution of July 7, 1950 and according to this Paragraph, the United Nations was obliged to take the final responsibility for the above actions.

These resolutions have, of course, stipulated the codes of conduct which the U.N. Forces must follow as an organized and disciplined armed forces in order to meet with the purposes and principles of the U.N. as defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 24.

MISCONDUCTS OF THE U.N. FORCES

Inspite of such tasks and codes of conduct, look what the U.N. Forces in Korea have done on the occasion of the military takeover of the ROK Government. ROK armed forces belonging to the U.N. Command pulled out of their positions without authorization and seized the legitimate Korean Government which the U.N. Forces was originally sent to help, whereas the U.N. Command just looked on and these ROK forces have not as yet returned to their original positions. These troops should be called deserters, but they are left at large to commit inhumane and un-

democratic atrocities as much as they like.

We can say, firstly, that the U.N. Forces in Korea are violating the resolutions of the Security Council and acting against their basic tasks. It would be better to say that the U.N. Forces in Korea have committed mutiny against the United Nations by just looking on while troops belonging to the U.N. Command took over the ROK Government which the U.N. was assisting.

Secondly, the U.N. Forces in Korea must be blamed for allowing, besides those ROK troops which pulled out of their positions and have not returned as yet, more than one-third of the officers of ROK armed forces to leave their positions (News Week, July 3 issue) which is inviting severe deterioration of military morale. And, moreover, by allowing the coup forces to commit all those atrocities in defiance of the spirit of the United Nations, the U.N. Forces in Korea cannot be free of the criticism that its Command is composed of officers who don't really know the purposes and principles of the U.N.

Can we now overlook the responsibility of the U.N. Command whose forces, composed of such malcontents, and with low morale, have committed mutiny against the United Nations? And can we overlook the responsibility of the Security Council which has sent such forces to Korea? These responsibilities must be strictly pursued. For, through such action alone, can the deplorable situation prevailing in Korea can be straightened out and thereby restore the authority of both the U.N. Forces and the Security Council.

STRAIGHTENING THINGS OUT

What methods are there to pursue these responsibilities? The matter must be pursued in both areas: firstly, to straighten out the deplorable situation now prevailing in Korea and secondly, to restore the authority of the U.N. Forces and the Security Council.

In regards to the responsibility of the U.N. Forces in Korea, the U.N. Command must admit that it is directly responsible for inviting such deplorable situation in Korea and must devise the necessary measures to restore things to the original state at once. For this, the U.N. Command must immediately dissolve the coup regime by using force if necessary. This would be rightful, for the coup regime had used force in seizing the legitimate government recognized by the U.N. The Command must also punish these military men who are participating in the coup regime according to general military regulations. But, full responsibility will not be taken until the Unified Command submit its report on the course of events and treatment of the affair to the Security Council as stipulated in Paragraph 6 of the U.N. resolution of July 7, 1950 and thus setting things right by executing the recommendations which the Security Council will decide on after reviewing the report.

As to the measures to restore the authority of the U.N. Forces and the Security Council, the Security Council must at once recommend the U.N. Forces in Korea to devise the necessary measures mentioned above to restore things to the original state and to reestablish the morale of the U.N. Forces in Korea. Then it must recieve reports on the progress of these measures from the U.N. Command. The responsibility of the Security Council does not end here either. It must send recommendations to those nations that contributed troops to the U.N. Forces during the Korean War and disperse the present U.N. Forces in Korea for committing such failures so disgraceful to the honor of the United Nations. (The question of resolving or recommending formation and despatch of new U.N. Forces to replace the present forces is an entirely different problem which should be taken up according to the circumstances.)

In case things are restored to the original state and the present coup regime dissolved, there might arise a situation in which Korea will have no government. In

order to resolve such problems, the responsibility of the UNCURK and the U.N. General Assembly must be inquired.

TASKS OF THE UNCURK

The UNCURK was organized and sent to Korea based on the U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 375, adopted on Oct. 5, 1950. In paragraph 2, item (a) of this Resolution, the Assembly resolved: the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, constituted by Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey, shall be established for the following purposes: (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission on Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after recieving recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The UNCURK should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible.

Let us first see what were the tasks assigned to the U.N. Commission on Korea. The Assembly in its Resolution No. 195, adopted on Dec. 12, 1948, directed the Commission: 1) to recommend, in accords with General Assembly Resolution (No. 112) of Nov. 14, 1947, the unification of Korea and merger of all security forces in Korea (par. 4, item a); 2) to work for facilitating the removal of social, economic and other obstacles, brought about by the division of Korea and barring friendly traffic, (par. 4, item b); 3) to assist, through observation and consultation, in developing representative government based on freely expressed will of the people, (par. 4, item c); 4) to observe the withdrawal of foreign forces (par, 4, item d). (The U.S. and Soviet forces were recommended to withdraw from Korea as early as practicable.)

The tasks 2) and 3), that is, the promotion of contact and exchange between North and South area of Korea, and the observation and consultation on developing representative government, were re-emphasized in the General Assembly Resolution No. 293 adopted on Oct. 21, 1949. The U.N. Commission on Korea, having these tasks, were given powers to travel, consult with and supervise throughout the territory of Korea (Resolution No. 195, par. 5, item c) and to consult with the Interim Committee (known as the Little General Assembly) (same Resolution, par. 5, item e), and, at the same time, were held responsible to render reports to the General Assembly and also to render such interim reports as it may deem appropriate to the Secretary General for transmission to Member Nations. (same Res., par. 5, item f).

As clear from the above U.N. resolutions, the UNCURK is therefore, entrusted with these important tasks: 1) to assist, as a representative of the United Nations, in establishing a unified, independent and democratic all-Korea government; 2) to facitate the removal of social, economic and other obstacles barring friendly traffic between North and South Korea; and 3) to supervise and assist in developing representative government in Korea. And it is also held responsible to render reports on these projects to the General Assembly and interim reports to the Secretary General. Let us then see what actions this UNCURK, with such tasks, have taken in connection with the recent South Korean military coup d'etat.

TOTAL NEGLECT OF DUTIES

The military coup leaders have overthrown, by violence, the legitimate ROK Government, which was established through elections enforced according to democratic procedures, and have set up a dictatorial regime in its place. Furthermore, they are now busy in devastating democracy in Korea by infringing upon the

basic human rights through unlawful arrests, torture and imprisonment, dissolving all political and social organizations and imposing strict control on free speech.

In face of this situation, all UNCURK has done so far is that it met in full session on June 3 in Seoul and issued a brief statement on June 16. The statement read: "The UNCURK resolved to formally request the present (ROK) Government to offer the Commission all possible cooperation, as it had enjoyed continuously heretofore, in order to execute the projects clearly written down in the U.N. resolutions concerned." And "through informal contacts with the ROK authorities . . . and mindful of the present conditions in Korea and the greatest interests of the Korean nation," the Commission also decided that the members of the Commission will seperately express their "individual concerns in relation to preservation of democracy in Korea." And at the end of the statement, it made clear to resume the conference on July 29. 1961, in order to prepare an annual report to submit to the 16th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

When we analyze this statement, we find that the UNCURK has, first of all, recognized the military regime as the legitimate government of the Republic of Korea; secondly, it has requested the military regime to cooperate and assist in UNCURK's projects (execution of the above tasks); thirdly, in regards to the present situation in Korea, it limited itself to express only individual concerns in connection with preserving the democratic system of Korea, having in mind "the present conditions in Korea and the greatest interests of the Korea nation," and lastly, it is to prepare its annual report to be sent to the General Assembly.

This is quite incomprehensible. For, first of all, it is preposterous that the UNCURK whose tasks are to promote contact and exchange between North and South Korea in order to bring about unification and to assist in developing a democratic representative government in Korea, should view the military regime, which has antagonized the tasks of the UNCURK, as a fait accompli, and, therefore, the legitimate government of Korea. Secondly, it is absolutely improper and absurd that the UNCURK should ask cooperation from such a regime. Thirdly, it is impossible to be mindful of the present conditions in Korea and, at the same time, the greatest interests of the Korean nation. And, moreover, it was mean and cowardly that the UNCURK limited its statement on preservation of democracy to express only individual concerns through informal contacts with the military regime when the UNCURK should express its opinion as a whole. And lastly, in view of the gravity of the situation in which the only legitimate government of Korea, meeting the requirements set by the U.N., was overthrown by the violence of a coup d'etat, the UNCURK cannot be free from the charge that it has totally neglected its duty in not rendering an interim report on the coup d'etat to the Secretary General for transmission to Member Nations, whereby a special General Assembly would have been convened.

U.N MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE MEASURES

Due to such neglect of duties and breach of tasks by the UNCURK, the way to seek resolution of the problem by convening a special General Assembly is getting difficult contrary to our hopes.

There is another surprise in store. An intrigue aiming to prevent the presentation of the Korean Question to the coming session of the General Assembly is being schemed within the UNCURK itself. The plot is to prepare UNCURK's annual report to the General Assembly in such manner that the Korean Question will be shelved until next year's session. (This was revealed by the Philippines delegate to the UNCURK, Juan M. Alleglado.) The intention of the intrigue is to give time to the military regime as its foreign minister Kim Hong Il has appealed. Can such

an intrigue be allowed? Absolutely not. It is quite hopeless to expect anything from this UNCURK which not only has neglected its duties but is scheming such an intrigue. Thus, we must request the discretion of the United Nations.

The U.N. Secretary General must at once request the UNCURK to render its interim report, transmit the report to Member Nations and convene a special General Assembly through the initiative of its Member Nations, or recommend the Security Council to convene a special General Assembly through a request of that Council. (In case impossible to convene a special General Assembly due to want in time for the necessary procedures, the Korean Question should be put at the top of the coming session's agenda.) And through resolution, the General Assembly must reorganize the UNCURK, and direct the newly reorganized UNCURK, in cooperation with the U.N. Forces stationed in Korea, to dissolve the military regime and release all the politicians held in detention; to restore the activities of political and social organizations; and to assist the delegates of all political and social organizations of Korea in setting up a caretaker government through consultation with them. (These actions might be criticized as intervention, but, such argument is totally improper. For, the formation and maintenance of the military regime were not carried out in accordance with the will of the Korean nation but was executed under the protection of foreign powers—in this sense, it must not be forgotten that the U.N. has performed an important role too. Nevertheless, if these actions cannot be taken in face of the principle of non-intervention, the U.N. authorities must, in accords with the General Assembly Resolution No. 195, whereby all Member Nations were requested to avoid any action that might impair the results achieved by the U.N. in realizing complete independence and unification of Korea, devise measures to recommend all foreign armed forces to withdraw from Korea and suspend all intervention by foreign powers in Korean internal affairs. And finally, it would be morally inpermissible to restore the deposed Chang Government, since it couldn't subdue the coup which was staged by a force no more than one two-hundredth of the entire ROK armed forces and was subjugated instead.)

The projects of this care-taker government must be placed under strict supervision of the UNCURK, and general elections must be held in a truly free atmosphere. The new National Assembly elected through the general elections shall decide how to deal with the Constitution of the Second Republic, but any provisions antagonizing democracy and unification shall not be tolerated.

Even with the authority and powers of the United Nations, it would be a difficult job to get these measures realized. But, no matter how difficult, the measures must be executed by the United Nations. For, in this way alone can the resolutions of the United Nations heretofore on Korea be saved from being cast away to the winds and thus preserve the authority of the U.N. getting undermined.

Democracy in Korea has been devastated. Just for demanding unification, more than ten thousand patriots have been thrown into jails without being served warrants and they are being persecuted and tortured deprived of their rights to consult lawyers. The power-hungry men, who are repeating the tragedy of washing blood with blood as we have seen in the purges and imprisonment being committed by the militarists on the Chang faction, possess secret intentions of creating international tentions in Korea for the sake of turning the nation's eyes away from the problems at home.

We must therefore conclude that if the United Nations should not take immediate measures now and leave things as it is by aquiescing to certain Big Powers, the consequences will be damaging not only for Korea but also for the maintenance of international peace.

PROFILE

CHANG DO YUNG AND PAK CHUNG HI

New Dictators of Korea

Lt. Gen. Chang Do Yung and Maj. Gen. Pak Chung Hi, the two strong men who powered themselves into the ruling position of South Korea as chairman and vice chairman of the military junta, show striking contrasts to one another.

Chang, after graduation from the Toyo University of Tokyo in 1944 and a year's service in the Japanese army, returned to Korea on her Liberation and decided to take the military up as his career. He finished up at the Military School of English in Seoul and by 1949, was already chief of the army intelligence bureau which post he served throughout the Korean War. After a year's study at the U.S. Command and General Staff College in 1953, he served such posts as 6th division commander, army vice chief of staff, 2nd army commander and finally, got to be named army chief of staff last February. Is 39 years old and hails from Shinju province in North Korea.

Pak, a graduate of the Sinkiang Military Academy of former puppet Manchuria and the Japanese Military Academy, also entered the ROK army after returning home. He steadily advanced through the posts of 5th and 7th division commanders, chief staff officer of the 1st army and served as vice chief of operations during the Korean War. In 1960, however, disliked by Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong Nok, then army chief of staff, was transferred to a lower position of vice commander of the 2nd army where he was stifling until the coup. Is 44 years old and comes from Songju province in South Korea.

Once they succeeded in their joint conspiracy to seize the government, a fierce inside battle began between the two. As the two differ vastly in character, belong to different factions and have different political views, the antagonism seems serious and is expected to shake up the army and the country as well.

Chang is an opportunist. He has always swum with the current, courted favor and made his way swiftly up the ladder. Pak, who leads a more austere life, is persistent in his undertakings and popular among young officers. The recent coup, in fact, was plotted and engineered mostly by Pak and his henchmen.

Factional strife has been the big factor causing disorder within the army. Chang leads his fellow North Koreans who make up a powerful part of the ROK army. The real boss of Pak and most of the junta men is former Lt. Gen. Song Yo Chan who was immediately called back from the U.S. where he was studying, and nominated Defense Minister, one of the posts Chang had held concurrently.

Reports from Seoul say that Chang and Pak have clashed head on in policies. They are said to be differing particularly on the time of returning the government to civilians. Chang endorses early transfer; whereas Pak persists in long-term military rule. Futhermore, Chang who is widely known in the American circle of Korea, is inclined to lean on U.S. aid. Pak, on the other hand, dislikes foreigners and would try to put a check on the Americans as much as he can without injuring the pro-American line.

As difficulties, internal and external, is mounting and social unrest growing, the antagonism will intensify each day. Chang, who has the weaker hand, is reported desperately trying to strengthen his foothold by bringing up his fellow provincials. Pak, the cold calculator, will not let chances slip by. So, a showdown for supremacy between the two seems not far away.


Government is formed, is uneasily aware that its inherited problems are deeper an[illegible] first supposed [illegible] relief that Korea will not be the last setback and that the popular call for action can be satisfied only by measures that experience has proved inadequate.

President Kennedy returned this morn[illegible] from Ottawa, where he seems not to h[illegible] persuaded the Canadian Government [illegible] join the Organization of American St[illegible] and immediately concerned himself with Korean and other foreign affairs that have taken up the best part of his time since his election. It was another bitter disappointment; only last [illegible] optimism for the country's futur[illegible] on the assumption [illegible] down nicely and wi[illegible] soon reach the point—so the jargon has it —of economic take-off.

Instead, another military regime seems [illegible] must be expected.

Action is wanted, and there is a strong belief among the politicians that the voters back in the districts want the Marines, and not economic advisers, to act.

This supposed groundswell of frustration and impatience, which has been mistaken for a return to conservatism, may well be the largest factor among those that persuaded the President to seek a meeting with Mr. Khrushchev. A confrontation [illegible] be interpreted here as a warning to [illegible] Soviet Union that the United States [illegible] prepared to suffer more defeats or setbacks.

PRIME MINISTER OF [illegible]

TOKYO, MAY 18.

Dr. John Chang, the South Korean

EDITORIALS AND COMMENTARIES ABROAD

THE TIMES, editorial, May 19.

The Army group, according to a Seoul broadcast, intend "to cultivate the capability of coping with the communists for the purpose of achieving national unification." If this rigmarole means anything it means nothing but a military solution of the problem.

What Korea needs most is some social and economic programme to fill out the anti-communism of which it must have had enough these past fifteen years. There is no reason yet to think that General Chang has much to offer to satisfy the demand for radical social and economic reform that has been growing in the year since Syhgman Rhee's downfall. It may be, if Pakistan can be taken as a parallel case, that corruption can be ended and the economy revived by military zeal. There are enough Korean peasants near starvation to welcome that without asking questions about freedom. But what satisfaction will there be for those other Koreans who were asking these questions? It remains to be seen whether the new group will earn popular support; they have certainly not gained power because of it.

NEW YORK TIMES, letter by Glenn D. Paige, assistant professor of University of Minnesota, currently advisor at the Seoul National University.

During their first month in power the military dictators have provided no evidence that they value or intend to restore a free society. While they have stated their goal is the establishment of a "genuine democratic republic", they have admitted, curiously that they do not know what its "political structure" will be like.

To criticize the junta is a crime. The military dictators are on an anti-Communist methods.

For the United States, this has not been our guiding principle and cannot be if we are to retain freedom ourselves and to inspire others to seek it.

In the present situation, the United States should insist upon the sovereign right of the Korean people to decide the kind of society and form of government under which they wish to live.

Korea's military rulers are gambling that the United States will support any regime in Korea which is anti-Communism.

Unless constitutional democracy is promptly restored in Korea, the United States ought to withdraw completely its economic and military support. Because of our strong identification with Korea, a totalitarian dictatorship of the right is just as damaging to America's international position as a totalitarian dictatorship of the left.

RADIOI MOSCOW, commentary, May 24.

Brutal ultra-reactionaries who will dare any challenge and adventure to threaten the peace in the Far East have grabbed the ruling powers of South Korea.

If we analyze this recent incident with a little care, we can easily see that the South Korean ultra-reactionaries couldn't have succeeded in their violence without the help of American imperialists.

The Americans, of course, are doing everything to prove that they had no connection in the affair. The voluntary resignation of Premier Chang and the withdrawal of resignation by President Run were dramas directed by the Americans.

RENMIN RIBAO (Peking), editorial, May 21.

At the outset of the military takeover in South Korea, the U.S. tried desperately to show that it had nothing to do with the coup faction.

But one cannot wrap a fire with papers. No matter how strong a statement the U.S. authorities in South Korea may issue or no matter how hard Washington may try to keep mum like a mute, the Americans cannot hide the truth about the May 16th coup in South Korea which was a fascist play directed by the Americans.

What we can say here is that as long as the American imperialists remain in South Korea, one cannot save her from doom no matter what kind of bloody rule may be attempted.

THE TIMES OF INDIA, editorial, May 18.

It is doubtful whether the army clique which has apparently engineered the downfall of the comparatively liberal administration under Dr. John Chang was impelled to do so by purely ideological motives. The claim that South Korea was gradually being "sold" to the Communists and the army was compelled to intervene to maintain a reliable anti-Communist front cannot be taken seriously; it is the usual formula by which all those who seize power attempt to justify their action. It is more than likely that personalities and factional ambitions have great relevance to what has occurred than any disinterested regard for either democracy or Communism.

The Kennedy regime cannot so easily, in Korean conditions, re-establish its reputation as a Government eager to encourage and support liberal movements in Asia. The only solution to this dinelma which is likely to become progressively acuter is a more vigorous policy of bringing about Korean unification before Western links with South Korea become impossible to maintain.

HINDUSTAN TIMES, editorial, June 15.

The United States is in the predicament of not only putting up with the South Korean military regime but also of financing it. U.S. aid, suspended since the military coup, has now been resumed. It is a hard choice that funds intended for the support of democracy should have to be extended to the incipient dictatorship.

The relaxation of Press censorship was illusory, since editors were charged with actin gas their own censors. Arrests have followed to emphasize the warning.

ASAHI SHIMBUN (Japan), editorial, May 17.

However bad the situation in Korea may have been, still to try to move the nation their own way through a coup d'etat is but turning the hands of the clock backwards.

What we hope is that the present constitutional government of South Korea shall not be devestated by undemocratic means.